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THE LIMITED POWER OF STATES TO 
REGULATE NONROAD MOBILE SOURCES 
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Johanna L. Wise Sullivan*
Abstract: The federal Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the State of Cali-
fornia to obtain Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permission in 
order to adopt “standards and other requirements relating to the con-
trol of emissions,” but expressly preempts all other states from adopting 
such regulations. Beginning January 1, 2007, California—which suffers 
the most severe air pollution in the country—will require all ships oper-
ating within twenty-four miles of the coast to limit emissions from auxil-
iary engines to levels that would be reached by using a certain low-sulfur 
fuel. If California’s new regulation falls within the CAA deªnition of 
“standards and other requirements,” it is invalid without EPA authoriza-
tion. Courts have generally found that “in-use” regulations, which are 
applied to the operation of motor vehicles and ocean vessels, are not 
covered by the preemption provisions of the CAA. However, a closer ex-
amination of differences between the CAA’s treatment of motor vehicles 
and nonroad vehicles, along with a recent Supreme Court decision in-
terpreting the deªnition of “standard,” indicates that California’s regu-
lation is preempted unless EPA grants authorization. 
Introduction 
 On December 8, 2005, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 
adopted a regulation that could signiªcantly reduce the emission of 
pollutants by the numerous ships visiting the State’s ports while en-
gaged in international commerce.1 The regulation will require all 
ships, foreign- and U.S.-ºagged, to limit emissions from auxiliary en-
gines to the levels that would be achieved by the use of a certain low-
sulfur fuel when operating within twenty-four miles of the California 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
1 News Release, California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board 
Adopts Measures to Reduce Emissions from Goods Movement Activities (Dec. 8, 2005) 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/nr120805.htm [hereinafter CalEPA News Re-
lease]. 
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coastline.2 While California is demonstrably in need of such measures 
to remedy its severe air pollution, the regulation pushes the limits of 
federalism.3
 Air pollution regulation in the United States has always been a 
joint effort between the federal and state governments.4 For the most 
part, states have considerable freedom in determining how they will 
meet the federal air quality standards.5 However, under the federal 
Clean Air Act (CAA), elements of mobile source air pollution regula-
tion are primarily the responsibility of the federal government, and 
states are preempted from applying certain regulations to mobile 
sources.6 California is provided an exception: the CAA waives it from 
preemption under certain circumstances and with Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) authorization.7 California’s waiver recog-
nizes that the state has been a leader in ªnding creative solutions to 
air pollution control.8
 The CAA provisions dealing with pollution from nonroad mobile 
sources, such as ships, establish a preemption structure that is incon-
sistent with the analogous provisions for motor vehicles.9 This Note 
examines the role of states, and particularly California, in the regula-
tion of nonroad mobile sources under the CAA, and concludes that 
CARB’s new regulation is preempted by the CAA unless CARB obtains 
                                                                                                                      
2 Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Staff Report: Initial Statement of Rea-
sons for Proposed Rulemaking App. A: Proposed Regulation for Auxiliary Diesel 
Engines Operated on Ocean-Going Vessels Within California Waters and 24 Nauti-
cal Miles of the California Baseline, at A-1, A-5 to A-6 (2005) (proposed Dec. 8, 2005) 
(to be codiªed at Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 2299.1), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/ 
marine2005/appa.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Regulation]. 
3 See Clean Air Act § 209(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e) (2000). To enhance clarity, the text of 
this Note will refer to Clean Air Act (CAA) section numbers in the text, as opposed to their 
codiªed section numbers in the United States Code. However, the footnotes will refer to 
the codiªed section numbers in the Code; see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 
1087–95 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Associated Press, Los Angeles Has the Worst Air Pollution in the 
United States, Government Says, Envtl. News Network, Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.enn. 
com/today.html?id=9255 (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) [hereinafter L.A. Air Pollution]. See 
generally No Net Increase Task Force, Report to Mayor Hahn And Councilwoman 
Hahn by the No Net Increase Task Force: Legal Working Group Memorandum (2005), 
available at www.portoºosangeles.org/DOC/REPORT_NNI_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter No 
Net Increase] (discussing state authority to regulate air pollution sources). 
4 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1078; No Net Increase, supra note 3, at 5-4. 
5 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1078–79. 
6 42 U.S.C. § 7543; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. 
7 42 U.S.C. § 7543; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. 
8 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079 (quoting Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 
F.2d 1095, 1109 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 7543; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1090–91. 
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authorization from EPA.10 However, by slightly altering the regulation, 
CARB may be able to avoid preemption and enforce emissions restric-
tions without EPA authorization.11
 Part I provides an overview of the trade activity occurring at Cali-
fornia’s ports, as well as the pollution it causes. Part II details the EPA’s 
efforts to regulate air pollution from nonroad sources under the CAA. 
Part III describes the statutory role of states in regulating air pollution 
from mobile sources, the scope of preemption under the CAA, and 
several cases concerning states’ authority. Finally, Part IV reviews the 
analysis for determining the CAA’s preemptive effect on a particular 
regulation, applies the analysis to California’s regulation, and suggests 
an alteration which could allow California to avoid preemption. 
I. Overview: California’s Ports & Pollution 
A. International Trade and Economic Impact 
 California is home to the busiest ports in the nation.12 Large vol-
umes of international goods enter the United States through the 
Ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Oakland, which are the ªrst, 
second, and fourth busiest ports in the country, respectively.13 From 
the ports, imports are distributed by truck and rail all over California 
and the U.S.14
 The quantity of goods imported through California’s ports is in-
creasing rapidly.15 In 2004, 1900 ships visited California’s ports, 
eighty-seven percent of which were foreign vessels.16 Estimates show 
                                                                                                                      
 
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e). 
11 See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 89 subpt. A, app. A (2005). 
12 Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Draft Emission Reduction Plan for 
Ports and International Goods Movement in California, at II-8 (2005) (on ªle with 
author) [hereinafter Draft Emission Reduction Plan]. 
13Id. at II-6; Port of Oakland: Facts & Figures, http://www.portofoakland.com/mari 
time/factsªg.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). The majority of international trade conducted 
through California ports is with East Asian countries, including China, Japan, Singapore. The 
Port of Long Beach: Overview, http://www.polb.com/about/overview/default.asp (last vis-
ited Dec. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Port of Long Beach: Overview]. 
14 Draft Emission Reduction Plan, supra note 12, at II-1. 
15 Id. at II-2. For example, the container trafªc at the Port of Oakland doubled be-
tween 1990 and 2004, and the number of containers at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach increased by forty percent from 2000 to 2004. Id. 
16 Id. at III-6. This number does not include the number of port visits by individual ships, 
many of which make numerous trans-ocean trips annually. The Ports of Los Angeles and 
Oakland report signiªcantly higher numbers for the number of annual cargo vessel arrivals, 
with 2646 and 1902 arrivals respectively. See The Port of Los Angeles: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions (FAQs), http://www.portoºosangeles.org/about_faq.htm#14 (last visited Dec. 30, 
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that freight volumes will more than double in the Los Angeles region 
over the next twenty years.17
 This trade through California’s ports is essential to the health of 
the state’s economy.18 The Port of Los Angeles alone generates $1.4 
billion in state and local tax revenue annually,19 while the Ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach together account for approximately $5.4 
billion annually in United States Customs revenues.20 Additionally, 
the Port of Los Angeles provides 16,360 jobs directly, and the move-
ment of goods through the ports ultimately supplies a total of 259,000 
jobs in the region, approximately one in twenty-nine jobs.21 The 
growth of the ports continually creates more jobs within the state, 
many with signiªcant opportunities for advancement.22
B. Impact of Port Activities on Air Quality 
 The international trade activities conducted at California’s ports 
and throughout the state also contribute signiªcantly to California’s 
severe air pollution problem.23 The Los Angeles region has the worst 
air pollution in the country.24 The activities at the adjacent Ports of 
Los Angeles and Long Beach, the two busiest container ports in the 
country, emit large amounts of diesel particulate matter (PM), nitro-
gen oxides (NOx), and sulfur oxides (SOx), pollutants which are as-
sociated with asthma, cancer, and other health problems.25 Currently, 
                                                                                                                      
 
2006); Port of Oakland: Facts & Figures, http://www.portofoakland.com/maritime/facts_ 
operations.asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2006). 
17 Draft Emission Reduction Plan, supra note 12, at II-2. 
18 Id. at ES-1; The Port of Los Angeles: An Economic Powerhouse, http://www.portof 
losangeles.org/about_economicimpact.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Port 
of Los Angeles: Economic Powerhouse]. 
19 Port of Los Angeles: Economic Powerhouse, supra note 18. 
20 Port of Long Beach: Overview, supra note 13. 
21 See Port of Los Angeles: Economic Powerhouse, supra note 18. Additionally, the Port 
of Long Beach alone provides one out of every eight jobs in the City of Long Beach, one 
out of every twenty-two jobs in the Los Angeles region, and 1.4 million jobs nationwide. 
Port of Long Beach: Overview, supra note 13. 
22 See Draft Emission Reduction Plan, supra note 12 , at ES-1. 
23 See id. at II-2. 
24 L.A. Air Pollution, supra note 3. The Los Angeles South Coast Air Basin is deemed a 
nonattainment area for ozone, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter because it ex-
ceeds the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) for those pollutants. Scorecard: The Pollution Informa-
tion Site, http://scorecard.org/env-releases/cap/naa-counties.tcl?naa_id=084 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2006). 
25 Draft Emission Reduction Plan, supra note 12, at chs. I–II. Nitrogen oxides and 
sulfur oxides contribute to the formation of ozone and ªne particulate matter, both of 
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the emissions of these pollutants attributable to the ports cause an 
estimated 750 premature deaths each year.26
 Every stage of the goods movement process creates air pollu-
tion.27 The ships that carry the goods use “high emitting [diesel] 
bunker fuel,” which emits pollutants both during transit and through 
power generation when berthed in the harbor.28 Once in the harbor, 
smaller boats such as tugboats support the large ocean vessels; cargo 
handling equipment such as cranes unload the ships; and trucks and 
locomotives transport the goods from the ports to other locations in 
California and the rest of the country.29 Each of these uses—harbor 
craft, cargo handling equipment, trucks, and locomotives—uses diesel 
fuel that emits PM, NOx, and SOx into the air.30
 As of 2001, ships were responsible for forty-three percent of the 
PM, twenty-three percent of the NOx, and ninety-two percent of the 
SOx emitted by the goods movement industry in California.31 Esti-
mates show that by the year 2020, ships will be the greatest contribu-
tor of PM, NOx, and SOx emissions attributable to the goods move-
ment industry in California.32 This predicted proportional increase is 
due in part to new engine standards and fuel requirements that are 
expected to reduce emissions from trucks, locomotives, harbor craft, 
and cargo handling equipment.33 At the same time, trade volume is 
expected to continue to increase, thus increasing the emissions of the 
now-unregulated ships.34
 While their emissions rates are greater, ships create proportion-
ately smaller health effects than land sources such as trucks, locomo-
tives, and cargo handling equipment because pollutants disperse as 
they move farther from their source.35 Pollutants emitted from ships 
over the ocean travel further, and are therefore less concentrated 
when they reach a community, than pollutants emitted over land.36 
Nonetheless, ships provide large amounts of pollutants that contribute 
                                                                                                                      
which are associated with adverse health effects ranging from asthma to conditions causing 
premature death. Id. at I-2, II-2. 
26 Id. at I-2. 
27 Id. at ES-4 to ES-6. 
28 Id. at ES-4, II-1. 
29 Id. at II-1. 
30 Id. at II-4, tbl.II-1. 
31 Draft Emission Reduction Plan, supra note 12, at II-5, ªg.II-3. 
32 Id. at II-9, ªg.II-7. 
33 Id. at II-4. 
34 Id. at II-4, II-7. 
35 Id. at II-2. 
36 Id. 
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to the air pollution problem, and unless addressed, it will only worsen 
as the trade volumes continue to increase over the coming decades.37
C. California’s Response to Port-Related Air Pollution 
 Partially in response to the state’s severe air pollution, the Califor-
nia Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) and Business, Trans-
portation, and Housing Agency have initiated a Goods Movement Ac-
tion Plan (GMAP).38 A main goal of GMAP is to improve air quality and 
protect public health by reducing the amount of pollution caused by 
the goods movement industry in California.39
 Pursuant to GMAP, on December 8, 2005, the California Air Re-
sources Board (CARB) adopted a regulation for the purpose of “re-
duc[ing] emissions of diesel PM, NOx, and SOx from . . . engines op-
erated on ocean-going vessels” in coastal waters.40 The regulation will 
apply to: 
any person who owns, operates, charters, rents, or leases an 
ocean-going vessel, including foreign-ºagged vessels, within 
any of the Regulated California Waters, which include all 
California inland waters . . . and all waters . . . within 24 nau-
tical miles, inclusive, of the California baseline, including 
but not limited to, the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, 
and any California port, roadstead, or terminal facility.41
 Effective January 1, 2007,42 the regulation will limit emission lev-
els of PM, NOx, and SOx from the auxiliary engines of large ocean-
                                                                                                                      
37 Draft Emission Reduction Plan, supra note 12, at II-2. 
38 See generally Bus., Transp., and Hous. Agency & Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Goods Movement Action Plan, Phase 1: Foundations (2005), available at http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/gmp/docs/ªnalgmpplan090205.pdf [hereinafter Goods Movement Plan]. 
39 Id. at III-1. The other main policy goals of the Goods Movement Action Plan 
(GMAP) are to generate jobs, increase mobility, relieve trafªc congestion, enhance public 
and port safety, and improve California’s quality of life, all through improvement and ex-
pansion of California’s goods movement industry and infrastructure. Id. 
40 CalEPA News Release, supra note 1; Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, at A-5 to A-6. 
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is a department of the California Environ-
mental Protection Agency that “oversees all air pollution control efforts in California to at-
tain and maintain health based air quality standards.” CalEPA News Release, supra note 1. 
41 Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, at A-1. 
42 CARB has indicated that although the regulation is not yet legally effective, it is fully 
expected to become effective before the end of 2006, and to be implemented beginning 
January 1, 2007. Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Advisory to Owners or Op-
erators of Ocean-Going Vessels Visiting California Ports 3 (Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/offroad/marinevess/documents/advisory0806.pdf. 
2007] State Power to Regulate Nonroad Mobile Sources 213 
going vessels.43 Speciªcally, the regulation requires that vessels’ auxil-
iary engines do not emit PM, NOx, or SOx in excess of what would 
result from the use of “marine gas oil [or] marine diesel oil . . . with a 
sulfur content of no more than 0.5 percent by weight.”44 Compliance 
with the regulation will be presumed when the vessel does in fact use 
the speciªed fuels.45
II. Federal Marine Environmental Regulation:  
The Clean Air Act 
A. Statutory Background and Structure 
 Under the CAA, the federal government assumes primary re-
sponsibility for regulating mobile sources of air pollution.46 Prior to 
the CAA Amendments of 1990, nonroad sources,47 such as ocean ves-
sels, were not federally regulated, although some states did regulate 
them.48 In 1990, Congress expanded the scope of federal regulation 
and added nonroad sources to the list of air pollution sources subject 
to regulation by EPA under the CAA.49 EPA’s regulatory power, how-
ever, is limited to emission standards on new nonroad engines and ve-
hicles.50
 The CAA does not require the owners or operators of nonroad 
diesel vehicles to use emission-controlling engines or low-polluting 
fuel.51 Rather, the CAA applies the requirements at the production 
                                                                                                                      
43 Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, at A-5 to A-6. Ships’ auxiliary engines are used 
for purposes other than propulsion, and “supply electricity and run other equipment on 
board.” Dennis Plaff, The Shipping News, Cal. Law., Apr. 2006, at 15; see Proposed Regula-
tion, supra note 2, at A-2. 
44 Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, at A-5 to A-6. Beginning January 1, 2010, the 
sulfur content of marine gas oil will be limited further to 0.1 percent by weight. Id. at A-6. 
45 Id. 
46 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1996); No Net Increase, 
supra note 3, at 5-4 to 5-5. 
47 “Nonroad vehicle” is deªned as “a vehicle that is powered by a nonroad engine and 
that is not a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition.” 42 U.S.C. § 7550(11) 
(2000). “Nonroad engine” is deªned as “an internal combustion engine (including the 
fuel system) that is not used in a motor vehicle or a vehicle used solely for competition, or 
that is not subject to standards promulgated under section 7411 of this title or 7521 of this 
title.” 42 U.S.C. § 7550(10). 
48 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1080. 
49 See Clean Air Act § 213, Pub. L. No. 101-544, § 213, 104 Stat. 2500 (current version 
at 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7547 (1988))); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 
1080. 
50 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(4). 
51 See id. §§ 7545, 7547. 
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level, both to new nonroad engines and vehicles and to the manufac-
turers of fuel.52 This approach presumably results in their use by the 
vehicle operators.53
B. Section 213: New Nonroad Engines and Vehicles 
 In section 213 of the CAA, Congress mandated that EPA promul-
gate regulations setting emissions standards for new nonroad engines 
and vehicles, including ocean vessels.54 Speciªcally, EPA has the au-
thority to set emissions standards for NOx, carbon monoxide, and 
volatile organic compounds which are known to cause adverse health 
effects.55 The standards must “achieve the greatest degree of emission 
reduction achievable through the application of technology . . . which 
. . . will be available” to the manufacturers of the engines while taking 
cost and safety into account.56
1. EPA’s Regulations 
 Pursuant to this authority, EPA has promulgated emissions stan-
dards and control programs for new nonroad engines and vehicles, 
including marine vessels.57 EPA has interpreted the deªnition of 
“new” to mean “show-room new . . . an engine or vehicle [i]s no 
longer new once it has left the retail showroom.”58 Thus, EPA applies 
the regulations to the vehicles during production, or at their original 
sale, but not to the use of the vehicles by their ultimate purchasers.59
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. An important difference between the fuel provisions and the engine/vehicle 
provisions of the CAA is that the fuel requirements apply to speciªc people involved in the 
fuel business who must comply, while the engine/vehicle provisions apply speciªcally to 
the engines and vehicles. Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. § 7547. 
55 Id. § 7547(a). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3). Speciªcally, Congress requires EPA to adopt standards 
which shall “achieve the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the 
application of technology . . . available for the engines or vehicles to which such standards 
apply, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of applying such technology within the 
period of time available to manufacturers and to noise, energy, and safety factors associ-
ated with the application of such technology.” Id. 
57 40 C.F.R. §§ 89, 94 (2005). 
58 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
59 Id. The Engine Manufacturers Association challenged this deªnition of “new,” argu-
ing instead to deªne “new” as engines “not in existence on the effective date of the 1990 
amendments” to the CAA. However, the D.C. Circuit Court rejected this deªnition in favor 
of the EPA’s deªnition, which is consistent with the regulations applying to motor vehicles. 
Id. at 1084–87. For a further discussion of Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, see infra Part III.C. 
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 The ocean vessels that are subject to California’s new regulation, 
and of concern to this Note, are Category 3 marine diesel engines, 
deªned by EPA as “very large marine engines used primarily for pro-
pulsion power on ocean-going vessels such as container ships, tankers, 
bulk carriers, and cruise ships.”60 EPA adopted two-tiered standards 
for regulating emissions from Category 3 engines.61 The Tier 1 stan-
dards, which were effective January 1, 2004, require new marine die-
sel engines to use technology that limits NOx emissions to the inter-
national standards set by the International Maritime Organization in 
MARPOL Annex VI.62 Tier 1 regulations do not apply to foreign-ºag 
marine vessels.63 In fact, EPA speciªcally decided not to apply regula-
tions to foreign vessels in U.S. waters, because it interpreted the CAA 
as not authorizing it.64 Even without foreign regulation, however, EPA 
estimates that the Tier 1 standards will reduce the NOx emissions of 
Category 3 engines by twenty percent by the year 2030.65 EPA noted 
that the standards of Annex VI adopted in Tier 1 have generally been 
followed by manufacturers since 2000, and thus immediate compli-
ance can be reasonably expected.66
                                                                                                                      
60 See Bluewater Network v. EPA, 372 F.3d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Control 
of Emissions From New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or Above 30 Liters Per 
Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746, 9747 (Feb. 28, 2003)); Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, 
at A-1. 
61 Bluewater Network, 372 F.3d at 408. 
62 Id.; Environmental Protection Agency, EPA420-12-03-004, Final Regulatory 
Support Document: Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-Ignition 
Engines at or Above 30 Liters per Cylinder 1-1 to 1-2 (2003), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/r03004.pdf [hereinafter Support Document]; 
see 40 C.F.R. § 94. Annex VI, the most recent international agreement of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, set limits on emissions of SOx and 
NOx from ship exhausts and set a 4.5% cap on the allowable sulfur content of diesel fuel 
used by ships. International Maritime Organization, Prevention of Air Pollution 
From Ships, http://www.imo.org/home.asp (Follow “Marine Environment” hyperlink; 
then follow “Air Pollution” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30, 2006) [hereinafter IMO, Pre-
vention]. The U.S. Senate has not yet ratiªed the treaty, but it became effective on May 
14, 2005. U.S. Department of State, Ocean Treaties, Sept. 29, 2005, available at http:// 
www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/54128.htm [hereinafter Ocean Treaties]; IMO, Preven-
tion, supra. The issue of whether MARPOL VI affects California’s authority to enforce its 
new regulation is beyond the scope of this Note. 
63 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 89.1(a), 94.1(b)(2). 
64 Id.; Clay J. Garside, Comment, Forcing the American People to Take the Hard NOx: The 
Failure to Regulate Foreign Vessels Under the Clean Air Act as Abuse of Discretion, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 
779, 796–98 (2005). 
65 Bluewater Network, 372 F.3d at 408 (quoting Control of Emissions From New Marine 
Compression-Ignition Engines at or Above 30 Liters Per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9746, 
9757, 9762). 
66 Id. at 410. 
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 Meanwhile, EPA is considering more stringent standards for Tier 
2, which will go into effect no later than April 27, 2007.67 EPA is also 
considering whether the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate foreign ves-
sels, and if so, whether to begin such regulation.68
2. EPA’s Responsibilities as Deªned in Bluewater Network v. EPA 
 In Bluewater Network v. EPA, an environmental group challenged 
EPA’s decision to defer regulation of engines on foreign vessels.69 
Bluewater argued that the CAA requires EPA to adopt emissions stan-
dards for foreign vessels, but the D.C. Circuit Court disagreed.70 Dur-
ing the rulemaking process, EPA had found that delaying regulation 
of foreign vessels would not make any signiªcant difference, because 
foreign vessels were already expected to comply with MARPOL Annex 
VI standards regardless of what EPA did.71 Furthermore, the language 
of the CAA did not clearly require EPA to apply regulations to foreign 
vessels.72 Accordingly, the court found that EPA’s decision to post-
pone regulations of foreign vessels adequately fulªlled its responsibili-
ties under the statute.73
 Despite the U.S. Senate’s refusal to ratify MARPOL Annex VI,74 
the emissions standards promulgated by EPA are equivalent to those 
of Annex VI.75 Thus, while the U.S. is not a party to the treaty, it has 
chosen to apply the same standards as the majority of the interna-
tional community with which the U.S. conducts trade.76
C. Section 211: Fuel Requirements 
 In section 211 of the CAA, Congress authorized EPA to regulate 
fuel and fuel additives—including fuel used by nonroad engines and 
vehicles—in order to decrease the adverse health and environmental 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. at 408, 410 (quoting Control of Emissions from New Marine Compression-
Ignition Engines at or Above 30 Liters Per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9746, 9757, 9762). 
68 Support Document, supra note 62, at 1-4. 
69 372 F.3d at 412. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 413. 
72 Id. at 412. 
73 Id. at 413. 
74 See Ocean Treaties, supra note 62. 
75 See Garside, supra note 64, at 788. 
76 See generally Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA420-F-04-031, Regulatory Update: Over-
view of EPA’s Emission Standards for Marine Engines (2004), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/nonroad/marine/420f04031.pdf. 
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effects of fuel.77 Speciªcally, EPA may impose requirements on manu-
facturers and processors of fuel prior to the sale or introduction of 
the fuel into commerce.78
 Congress also set sulfur content limits for motor vehicle diesel 
fuel, by prohibiting the “manufacture, [sale], supply, offer for sale or 
supply, dispense, transport, or introduc[tion] into commerce” of any 
motor vehicle fuel containing greater than 0.05% sulfur by weight.79 
Additionally, EPA had authority to require importers to segregate die-
sel fuel not intended for use in motor vehicles from motor vehicle 
diesel fuel.80 However, Congress did not set sulfur content require-
ments for nonroad diesel fuel like that used in large ocean vessels, but 
instead gave EPA discretion to make that determination.81
 Accordingly, EPA established allowable levels of sulfur in diesel 
fuels used by marine engines that will reduce their PM and SOx emis-
sions.82 These regulations are applicable to reªners of diesel fuel used 
by nonroad, locomotive, and marine engines.83 EPA will implement 
the limit in three phases, the ªrst phase effective June 1, 2007, with 
lower levels of sulfur allowed in each succeeding phase.84
III. State Power to Regulate Emissions from Mobile Sources 
A. Motor Vehicle Regulation 
 Under the CAA, the “States and the Federal Government [are] 
partners in the struggle against air pollution,” although California has 
broader power than other states.85 Since Congress enacted the CAA, a 
primary role of the states has been the regulation of stationary 
                                                                                                                      
77 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2000). 
78 Id. § 7545(a). 
79 Id. § 7545(i). 
80 Id. § 7545(i)(2). 
81 Id. § 7545(i). 
82 Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA420-R-04-007, Final Regulatory Analysis: Control 
of Emissions from Nonroad Diesel Engines ES-5 (2004), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/nonroad-diesel/2004fr/420r04007a.pdf [hereinafter Final Regulatory Analysis]. 
The sulfur in diesel fuel impairs the emission control devices on the engines, so an addi-
tional beneªt of using low-sulfur fuel is that it “will enable advanced high efªciency emis-
sion control technology to be applied to nonroad engines” that will achieve even greater 
emission reductions than merely the use of the fuel itself. Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at ES-5 to ES-6. 
85 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990)). 
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sources of air pollution, such as factories.86 However, the regulation of 
mobile sources of air pollution, such as motor vehicles, is left primar-
ily to the federal government.87 Congress eventually adopted section 
209(a) of the CAA, which expressly preempts states from regulating 
new motor vehicles.88 There were two rationales for preemption: First, 
state regulation of motor vehicles would complicate enforcement due 
to the frequency with which motor vehicles move across state bounda-
ries; and second, different regulations in each state would create tre-
mendous difªculty for automobile manufacturers and would severely 
obstruct interstate commerce.89
 Despite the potential problems with state regulation of new motor 
vehicles, Congress acknowledged that California already led the coun-
try in regulating automotive pollution.90 Congress granted California 
an exemption from preemption under section 209(a), and thereby 
allowed California to continue its regulation of emissions from new 
motor vehicles.91 In the 1977 Amendments of the CAA, Congress per-
mitted states to choose between the California regulations and the 
federal regulations.92
 Additionally, Congress explicitly preserved the power of states to 
regulate motor vehicles in certain ways.93 Section 209(d) provides 
“[n]othing in this part shall preclude or deny to any State or political 
subdivision thereof the right otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict 
the use, operation, or movement of registered or licensed motor vehi-
cles.”94 This provision has generally been interpreted as maintaining 
state power to regulate pollution from motor vehicles once they are 
no longer new; for instance, through in-use regulations such as car-
pool lanes and other incentive programs.95
                                                                                                                      
86 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1078–79; see 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
87 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. The text of section 209(a) 
provides, “[n]o State . . . shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the 
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7543(a). 
89 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. 
v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 810 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 
90 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079. 
91 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1079–80. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 7507; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1080. 
93 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d). 
94 Id. 
95 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094. 
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B. State Regulatory Power of Nonroad Engines 
 In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress mandated 
EPA regulation of nonroad engines and vehicles.96 To some extent, it 
replicated the state-federal regulatory regime of motor vehicles.97 
First, the statute explicitly prohibits any state from setting emissions 
standards relating to new locomotive engines and to new engines in 
construction and farm equipment that are less than 175 horse-
power.98 Next, section 209(e) explicitly preempts states from adopting 
their own emission standards for other nonroad engines and vehicles, 
except for California, which may avoid federal preemption of “stan-
dards and other requirements relating to the control of emissions 
from [nonroad] vehicles or engines” under certain circumstances.99
 Speciªcally, section 209(e)(2) provides: “In the case of any non-
road vehicles or engines other than [new locomotive engines and 
smaller engines in farm or construction equipment], the [EPA] Ad-
ministrator shall . . . authorize California to adopt and enforce stan-
dards and other requirements relating to the control of emissions 
from such vehicles or engines . . . .”100 EPA may authorize California’s 
“standards and other requirements” only if “California determines 
that [its] standards will be at least as protective of the public health 
and welfare as the applicable Federal standards.”101 Furthermore, EPA 
must deny authorization if it ªnds that California’s standards are un-
necessary, or if the standards and enforcement procedures are incon-
sistent with the rest of section 209.102
 Every other state may adopt California’s “standards relating to the 
control of emissions from nonroad vehicles or engines.”103 Congress 
                                                                                                                      
 
96 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 222(b), 104 Stat. 2502 
(1990) (codiªed at 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)). 
97 See id. 
98 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(1). These types of engines are not at issue in this Note. 
99 Id. § 7543. California’s preemption waiver in this section is different from its exemp-
tion for motor vehicle regulations in section 209(b)(1) because it does not speciªcally use 
the word “new” to describe the nonroad vehicles that California may regulate. See id.; supra 
notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2). Ocean vessels and their engines fall within the meaning of 
“nonroad vehicles” under the statute. See id. The CAA deªnes nonroad engine as “an in-
ternal combustion engine that is not used in a motor vehicle” and nonroad vehicle as one 
that “is powered by a nonroad engine and is not a motor vehicle.” Id. § 7550. 
101 Id. § 7543(e)(2)(A). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. § 7543(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added) (“Any state other than California . . . may 
adopt and enforce . . . standards relating to the control of emissions from nonroad vehi-
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did not allow for other states to adopt California’s “other require-
ments” relating to control of emissions from nonroad vehicles.104
 Unlike other related parts of the CAA, section 209(e) does not 
use the word “new” to describe the nonroad engines that California 
may regulate with EPA authorization.105 Instead, the word “any” de-
scribes the nonroad engines that California may regulate.106 In con-
trast, EPA speciªcally has the authority to regulate emissions of only 
new nonroad sources.107 Additionally, the corresponding portion of 
section 209, which provides waiver from federal preemption for mo-
tor vehicle emissions regulations, speciªcally applies to “standard[s] 
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new 
motor vehicle engines.”108
C. Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA and Implied Preemption 
 One case has interpreted the breadth of state power to regulate 
emissions of nonroad engines and vehicles under CAA section 209(e).109 
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA examined two main issues: (1) which 
nonroad engines and vehicles states may regulate; and (2) what types of 
regulations states may enforce.110 In Engine Manufacturers Ass’n, the En-
gine Manufacturers Association (EMA) challenged several aspects of 
EPA’s interpretation of the scope of implied preemption under section 
209(e).111 Two of these aspects are relevant to this Note: (1) whether 
section 209(e) preempts states from regulating non-new engines and 
vehicles; and (2) whether in-use regulations are “other requirements” 
under section 209(e) and are therefore implicitly preempted.112
 The parties agreed that the structure of section 209(e) implied 
preemption.113 As the D.C. Circuit Court explained: 
                                                                                                                      
cles or engines . . . if such standards and implementation and enforcement are identical 
. . . to the California standards authorized by the [EPA] Administrator . . . .”). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. §§ 7543(a), (b), (e), 7547; see Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1090–92 
(D.C. Cir. 1996). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (“In the case of any nonroad vehicles or engines other 
than those referred to in [section 209(e)(1)] . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
107 Id. §§ 7543(e)(2)(A), 7547(a)(3). 
108 Id. § 7543(a) (emphasis added). 
109 See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d 1075. 
110 Id. at 1087–94. 
111 Id. at 1082–94. 
112 Id. at 1078. 
113 Id. at 1087. Courts may ªnd that a federal law implicitly preempts a state law when 
“the federal statute’s structure and purpose, or nonspeciªc statutory language, reveal 
clear, but implicit, preemptive intent.” 81A C.J.S. States § 51 (2005). 
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Obviously, if no state regulation were preempted, California 
would have no need to seek authorization for its regulations, 
and other states would not need to opt in to the California 
rules. Thus, the California authorization provision assumes 
the existence of a category of sources that are subject to pre-
emption. In other words, states must be preempted from 
adopting any regulation for which California could receive 
authorization.114
However, the parties disagreed over which nonroad engines and vehi-
cles, and which types of regulations, were covered by the preemptive 
provisions of the statute.115
1. Nonroad Vehicles States Can Regulate 
 Speciªcally, EMA argued that the implied preemption of section 
209(e) was not limited to new nonroad engines as EPA had decided.116 
Instead, EMA contended that the statute’s preemption covered state 
regulation of any nonroad engines and vehicles—new and non-new— 
other than the locomotive, construction, and farm engines covered in 
section 209(e)(1).117 EMA’s argument relied on the “plain statement” 
of the statute.118 The language of the statute itself—the absence of the 
word “new” from section 209(e)(2), and the presence of the word 
“any” to modify the nonroad engines and vehicles for which California 
may seek authorization to regulate119—indicates that the preemption 
is not limited to “new” nonroad engines and vehicles.120
 EPA argued, however, that the word “new” should be read into 
section 209(e)(2) in order to avoid a discrepancy in the authorization 
regime.121 Because EPA is only authorized to regulate new nonroad 
engines and vehicles, there would be no applicable federal standards 
to compare to California’s regulations of non-new, nonroad sources in 
the authorization process as required by section 209(e)(2).122 There-
fore, EPA argued, “the statute does not provide any basis for the EPA 
to determine whether to authorize a proposed California regula-
                                                                                                                      
114 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1087–88 (citations omitted). 
115 Id. at 1087. 
116 Id. 
117 Id.; see supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
118 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1088. 
119 See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
120 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1088. 
121 Id. at 1088–89. 
122 Id. at 1089. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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tion.”123 Furthermore, EPA argued, Congress could not have intended 
to leave a regulatory gap by preempting states from regulating non-
new engines and vehicles that EPA cannot regulate itself.124
 After ªnding nothing helpful in the legislative history, the D.C. 
Circuit Court found EMA’s literal reading of the statute—that state 
regulation of both new and non-new engines and vehicles was pre-
empted—to be correct.125 The absence of the word “new” in section 
209(e)(2) is not insigniªcant, and therefore EPA’s interpretation that 
states were only preempted from regulating “new” nonroad sources 
was erroneous.126 Section 209(e)(2), the court found, preempts states 
from regulating both new and non-new sources, and requires Califor-
nia to obtain authorization for regulation of such sources.127
 The court reasoned that despite the seemingly odd structure of 
the statute, the word “new” cannot be read into the statute without 
evidence that Congress intended such a reading of the statute.128 
EPA’s contention that the odd result demonstrated that Congress 
simply could not have intended the statute to be read literally was un-
convincing and inappropriate without any support from the legislative 
history or elsewhere.129 Instead, the court declared, “[i]t is . . . con-
ceivable that Congress meant to require California to come to the 
EPA before regulating sources not within the EPA’s own regulatory 
authority.”130
 Additionally, the court did not agree that the “regulatory gap” 
referred to by EPA required a nonliteral reading of the statute, be-
cause all nonroad sources were subject to regulation under the stat-
ute.131 Speciªcally, the court found, “the statute does not [actually] 
exempt any class of nonroad sources from regulation,” and thus any 
gap is insigniªcant.132
                                                                                                                      
123 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1089. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1090–92. 
126 Id. at 1090. 
127 See id. at 1090–91. 
128 Id. at 1092. 
129 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1092–93 (“Essentially, the EPA concludes that the con-
ferees inadvertently left out the word new in § 209(e)(2), and the EPA is, in fact, adhering 
to what was intended. Without a showing that the text is demonstrably at odds with Con-
gressional intent, much less that the regulatory scheme is unworkable or absurd, however, 
the court must take Congress at its word.”). 
130 Id. at 1090. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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2. Types of Regulations States Can Enforce 
 Next, EMA challenged EPA’s interpretation of what types of regu-
lations states are permitted to adopt.133 EPA had decided that states’ 
in-use regulations134 are not preempted under section 209(e)(2) be-
cause they are “neither standards [nor] other requirements relating 
to the control of emissions.”135 EMA challenged this decision on the 
grounds that in-use regulations aimed at reducing emissions are in 
fact “other requirements relating to the control of emissions” that 
states are preempted from adopting and enforcing.136 Thus, EMA ar-
gued that states are only permitted to make in-use regulations that are 
unrelated to emissions control.137
 Instead of independently analyzing the language of the statute, the 
court deferred to EPA’s interpretation, and noted EMA’s failure to of-
fer a satisfying alternative interpretation.138 EPA contended that the 
“other requirements” that states are preempted from adopting under 
section 209(e) are only “certiªcation, inspection, or approval” require-
ments which relate to the control of emissions.139 EPA pointed out that 
in other parts of section 209, the words “require” and “requirement” 
referred to “certiªcation, inspection, or approval” relating to emis-
sions.140 EPA accordingly argued, and the court accepted, that the word 
“requirements” in section 209(e)(2) must also refer to certiªcation, 
inspection, or approval requirements, and not to in-use requirements, 
consistent with the rest of section 209.141
                                                                                                                      
133 Id. at 1093. 
134 Id. at 1094. In-use regulations are applied to the actual use of the engine or vehicle, 
such as carpool lanes and idling restrictions. See id. 
135 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1093; see Clean Air Act, § 209(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7543(e)(2) (2000). 
136 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1093; see 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2). The court noted that 
EMA did not challenge EPA’s previously approved interpretation of “standard” to mean 
“quantitative levels of emissions.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1093 (citing Motor & Equip. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1112–13 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
137 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094. 
138 See id. at 1093–94. 
139 Id. at 1093. 
140 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 7543. 
141 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1093. EMA argued that the absence of the words “cer-
tiªcation, inspection, or approval” indicated Congress’s intent to assign a different mean-
ing to “requirement” in section 209(e)(2). Id. The court replied that EMA’s argument did 
not take into account that section 209(e)(2)(B) gives states the power only to adopt Cali-
fornia’s “standards,” not California’s “other requirements.” Id. Without further reasoning, 
the court concluded that “[t]hough the text does not compel the EPA’s interpretation, it 
does not forbid it either.” Id. 
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 Once it determined the meaning of “requirements” in section 
209(e), the court also found that section 209(d) preserves the states’ 
rights to enforce in-use regulations of nonroad engines and vehi-
cles.142 Section 209(d) provides: “Nothing in this part shall preclude 
or deny to any State or political subdivision thereof the right other-
wise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement 
of registered or licensed motor vehicles.”143 Under the motor vehicle 
regulatory scheme, this provision ensures that states have been al-
lowed to adopt in-use regulations, such as “carpool lanes . . . and pro-
grams that control extended idling of vehicles.”144
 The court also examined how section 209(d) operates in con-
junction with section 213(d), attempting to discern the effect of sec-
tion 209(d) on the regulation of nonroad vehicles and engines.145 
Section 213(d) states, “[t]he standards under this section shall be sub-
ject to [section 209] of this title.”146 The court did not formulate its 
own interpretation of what this cross-reference means.147 Again, the 
court simply deferred to EPA’s interpretation, noting EMA’s “fail[ure] 
to offer any coherent alternative.”148
 EPA argued that because section 209(d) was already in effect at 
the time that sections 213 and 209(e) were adopted, the reference in 
section 213149 to section 209 could reasonably be interpreted as add-
ing nonroad vehicles to the end of the paragraph in section 209(d).150 
EPA used this interpretation to support its position that section 
209(d) preserves the rights of states to regulate the use of nonroad 
vehicles, in addition to motor vehicles.151
 Acknowledging the ambiguity of section 209(e) when read in 
conjunction with sections 209 and 213 of the CAA, the court adopted 
                                                                                                                      
142 Id. at 1093–94. 
143 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d). 
144 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094. 
145 Id. at 1093–94. 
146 42 U.S.C. § 7547(d); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094; see 42 U.S.C. § 7543. 
147 See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094. 
148 Id. 
149 Section 213 of the CAA concerns only nonroad vehicles and engines. See supra Part 
II.B. 
150 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1093–94. 
151 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(d)–(e), 7547; Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094. EPA’s inter-
pretation amounted to a change in the text of section 209(d) to say the following: “Noth-
ing in this part shall preclude or deny to any State or political division thereof the right 
otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or 
licensed motor or nonroad vehicles.” See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 
1094. 
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EPA’s view that the statutory structure must preserve the states’ right 
to impose in-use regulations on nonroad vehicles.152 After deciding 
that section 209(d) could be interpreted to include nonroad vehicles 
and engines, EPA and the court further supported their conclusion 
with comparison to the motor vehicle regulatory regime, which has 
always permitted states to adopt in-use regulations intended to control 
emissions, “such as carpool lanes, restrictions on car use in downtown 
areas, and programs to control extended idling of vehicles.”153
3. EPA’s Responding Regulations 
 In response to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, EPA changed its regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to section 209(e).154 First, EPA ex-
pressly adopted the court’s decision by clarifying that California is re-
quired to obtain EPA authorization to enforce all of its “adopted 
standards and other requirements relating to the control of emissions 
from nonroad vehicles or engines,” instead of only requiring EPA au-
thorization for California’s regulation of new nonroad vehicles or en-
gines.155 Furthermore, EPA clariªed its opinion that states are not 
“precluded under section 209 from regulating the use and operation 
of nonroad engines, such as regulations on hours of usage, daily mass 
emission limits, or sulfur limits on fuel; nor are permits regulating 
such operations precluded, once the engine is no longer new.”156 
Thus, according to EPA, CAA section 209(e) does not require Cali-
fornia to obtain authorization to enforce a regulation limiting the sul-
fur concentration of fuel used by large ocean vessels, because it is a 
regulation of their use and operation.157 The California Air Resources 
Board also takes this position in its statement of legal authority for 
adopting and enforcing the new regulation.158
                                                                                                                      
152 Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094. 
153 Id. 
154 Control of Air Pollution: Emissions Standards for New Nonroad Compression-
Ignition Engines at or Above 37 Kilowatts, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,733, 67,734 (Dec. 30, 1997) (to 
be codiªed at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85, 89); see 40 C.F.R. § 89 (2005). 
155 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,735; see 40 C.F.R. § 85.1604. 
156 62 Fed. Reg. at 67,736; 40 C.F.R. § 89 subpt. A, app. A. 
157 See 40 C.F.R. § 89 subpt. A, app. A; Proposed Regulation, supra note 2, at A-1. 
158 Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Staff Report: Initial Statement of 
Reasons for Proposed Rulemaking App. B: ARB’s Legal Authority B-12 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/marine2005/appb.pdf [hereinafter CARB’s Legal 
Authority]. 
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D. The Deªnition of Standards: Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South 
Coast Air Quality 
 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling that states are not preempted by section 
209(e) from adopting in-use regulations for nonroad engines and ve-
hicles is questionable in light of the Supreme Court’s more recent 
decision in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District.159 In South Coast Air Quality, EMA—once again the 
plaintiff—challenged regulations adopted by the South Coast Air 
Quality Management District (SCAQMD).160 The challenged regula-
tions, collectively called the Fleet Rules, applied to the operators of 
ºeets of motor vehicles, such as public transit vehicles, urban buses, 
street sweepers, waste collection vehicles, and taxicabs, among oth-
ers.161 The Fleet Rules prescribed the types of vehicles that operators 
were permitted to purchase or lease for their ºeets, requiring either 
that the vehicles were alternatively fueled,162 or that they meet certain 
emission speciªcations of the state.163
 EMA challenged the Fleet Rules on the grounds that they were 
prohibited by the motor vehicle preemption provisions of section 
209.164 The District Court of California granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, holding that the Fleet Rules were not “stan-
dards” within the meaning of section 209.165 Instead, the District 
Court reasoned, they only regulated the purchase of vehicles, distin-
guishable from the regulation of sales which mandate that manufac-
turers of engines and vehicles meet certain emissions requirements.166
                                                                                                                      
159 See 541 U.S. 246 (2004). 
160 Id. at 249. The South Coast Air Quality Management District is the California entity 
responsible for developing the Los Angeles basin’s comprehensive plan for reducing emis-
sions and achieving state and federal ambient air quality standards. Id. (citing Cal. 
Health & Safety Code Ann. § 40402(e) (West 1996)). 
161 Id. 
162 Alternative-fuel vehicles are deªned in various ways, but generally include those 
that are powered by something other than diesel fuel, such as liqueªed natural gas, liqui-
ªed petroleum gas, methanol, electricity, or fuel cells. Id. at 249 n.1. 
163 Id. at 249–50. 
164 Id. at 251. Section 209(a) prohibits states from adopting “standard[s] relating to 
the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines.” Clean 
Air Act § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). 
165 S. Coast Air Quality, 541 U.S. at 251. 
166 Id. at 251–52. “‘Where a state regulation does not compel manufacturers to meet a 
new emissions limit, but rather affects the purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules do, that 
regulation is not a standard.’” Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. 
Dist., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2001)). 
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 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority of eight,167 rejected the Dis-
trict Court’s reasoning.168 The Supreme Court held that equating the 
Fleet Rules with “standards” did not depend on whether they regulate 
the purchase or sale of vehicles, but rather depended on whether they 
fall within the deªnition of the word standard, “assum[ing] that the 
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose.”169
 Accordingly, the Court turned to the dictionary to determine the 
meaning of “standard.”170 Webster’s Dictionary deªnes standard as 
that which “‘is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as 
a model or example; criterion; test.’”171 Thus, the Court found: 
[t]he criteria referred to in § 209(a) relates to the emission 
characteristics of a vehicle or engine. To meet them the vehi-
cle or engine must not emit more than a certain amount of a 
given pollutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pol-
lution-control device, or must have some other design feature 
related to the control of emissions. This interpretation is con-
sistent with the use of “standard” throughout Title II of the 
CAA (which governs emissions from moving sources) to de-
note requirements such as numerical emission levels with 
which vehicles or engines must comply, or emission-control 
technology with which they must be equipped.172
 In addition, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that un-
der the CAA, “standards” only include production mandates applica-
ble to manufacturers.173 The Court explained that standards are alto-
gether different from the method of their enforcement.174 “While 
standards target vehicles or engines, standard-enforcement efforts . . . 
can be directed to manufacturers or purchasers.”175 The CAA does 
not limit enforcement of emissions standards to the manufacturers of 
                                                                                                                      
167 Justice Souter was the lone dissenter. See id. at 259 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 252 (majority opinion). 
169 Id. (quoting Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). 
170 Id. at 252–53. 
171 S. Coast Air Quality, 541 U.S. at 253–54 (quoting Webster’s Second New Interna-
tional Dictionary 2455 (1945)). 
172 Id. at 253 (internal citations omitted). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 253. 
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vehicles, but rather allows also for standard enforcement against vehi-
cle sellers and purchasers.176
 The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to consider several 
issues in light of its decision.177 The Court recognized that several is-
sues had not been raised on appeal that could affect the overall result 
of the case.178 On remand, the District Court of Central California 
addressed the issues that had not been heard before the Supreme 
Court, and ultimately found that the Fleet Rules were not preempted 
by section 209.179 The court’s reasoning was unrelated to the Supreme 
Court’s deªnition of standard.180 Instead, the court found that the 
application of the Fleet Rules to state and local governments falls 
within the market participant doctrine, which provides that actions by 
a state which are proprietary, rather than regulatory, are not pre-
empted by federal law unless Congress expressly preempts such pro-
prietary conduct.181
IV. Applying Section 209(e) to California’s New Regulation 
A. Regulatory Structure Under Section 209(e) 
 Together, the Supreme Court’s decision in Engine Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District and the D.C. Circuit 
Court’s decision in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA clarify that CAA 
sections 209(e) and 213 create a multi-part regulatory structure for 
nonroad vessels.182 While California and EPA share regulatory author-
ity in a seemingly odd way, other states are wholly preempted from 
making any “standard or other requirement relating to the control of 
emissions” from nonroad vehicles.183
 When new nonroad vehicles and engines are the subject of the 
regulation, California and EPA share dual authority to adopt and en-
force “standards and other requirements relating to the control of 
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emissions.”184 However, California must obtain EPA authorization, 
and must fulªll the other statutory requirements of section 209(e) by 
showing that the state has a need for the regulations, and that they 
will be at least as protective of the public health as federal stan-
dards.185
 When non-new nonroad engines are the subject of the regula-
tion, California has the sole authority to adopt and enforce “standards 
and other requirements relating to the control of emissions.”186 
Again, however, California must obtain EPA authorization.187 While it 
does seem odd that Congress would structure a regulatory regime in 
this way—odd enough that EPA’s argument that Congress must have 
made a mistake in leaving out the word “new” is plausible—the stat-
ute, on its face, requires this reading.188
 Lastly, when the regulations are neither “standards [nor] other 
requirements relating to the control of emissions,” states are not pre-
empted from adopting and enforcing regulations against any nonroad 
engines or vehicles.189 Similarly, California is not required to obtain 
EPA authorization for such regulations.190
B. Preemption Analysis Under Section 209(e) 
 The ªrst question when evaluating the preemptive effect of section 
209(e) on a regulation is whether the regulation is a “standard or other 
requirement relating to the control of emissions.”191 If not, then the 
regulation is not preempted by the CAA.192 However, if the regulation 
is a standard or other requirement, then it is preempted for all states 
except California.193 California, however, must look at which vehicles it 
regulates; if it regulates vehicles covered by section 209(e)(1), then it is 
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preempted.194 If it regulates any other nonroad vehicle, then California 
must obtain authorization from EPA to avoid preemption.195
1. The Deªnition of Standard: The Effect of South Coast Air Quality on 
the Scope of Section 209(e)’s Preemption 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
South Coast Air Quality Management District clariªes the preemption 
analysis to be applied under section 209(e).196 In its redeªnition of 
“standard,” the Supreme Court effectively broadened the scope of 
state regulations preempted by the CAA.197 As a result, the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court’s decision in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA regarding in-
use regulations is highly questionable.198
 At the time of Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit 
Court had already approved EPA’s deªnition of standard to mean 
“quantitative levels of emissions,” and therefore summarily decided that 
in-use regulations were not standards.199 However, in South Coast Air 
Quality, the Supreme Court adopted a more expansive deªnition of 
standard— “a criteria relat[ing] to the emission characteristics of a ve-
hicle or engine.”200 Consequently, now a court must examine whether a 
regulation sets a standard under this broader deªnition, and some in-
use regulations may be standards under section 209(e), while others 
are not.201 Regulations are subject to a different scrutiny in determin-
ing whether they are “standards” that are preempted by CAA section 
209(e).202
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 At the same time, the Supreme Court’s newly adopted deªnition 
of standard, while accurate according to the dictionary, is less precise 
than the previously accepted “quantitative level of emissions.”203 While 
the Supreme Court’s deªnition offers minimal guidance for what actu-
ally falls within it, the Court stated: “[In order to meet the standards,] 
the vehicle must not emit more than a certain amount of a given pol-
lutant, must be equipped with a certain type of pollution-control de-
vice, or must have some other design feature related to the control of 
emissions.”204 At the very least, this list indicates that any regulation 
which falls within one of the stated categories is a standard.205 Fur-
thermore, the language suggests that the given categories comprise an 
exhaustive list of the types of regulations that are “standards relating to 
the control of emissions” covered by the preemption provisions of sec-
tion 209(e).206 The Court did not indicate that this list amounts to 
mere examples of what is a standard under section 209, but rather im-
plied that this list encompasses a complete description of what is a 
“standard relating to the control of emissions.”207
2. Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA Incorrectly Found That In-Use 
Regulations of Nonroad Vehicles Are Not Preempted 
 EPA’s reasoning, which the court adopted in Engine Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. EPA, for ªnding non-preemption of in-use regulations under 
section 209(e) was unmistakably ºawed.208 EPA relied on a compari-
son with states’ accepted power to adopt in-use regulations intended 
to control emissions from motor vehicles.209 However, blindly apply-
ing the same preemption analysis to nonroad engines is erroneous 
because section 209(e) preempts a broader range of regulations for 
nonroad vehicles than section 209(a) does for motor vehicles.210
 Because section 209(a) only preempts states from adopting emis-
sions standards for new motor vehicles, in-use regulations of motor 
vehicles are, by deªnition, never preempted.211 By the time a motor 
vehicle is “in-use,” it is no longer new, and therefore not covered by 
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the express preemption of section 209(a).212 In contrast, section 
209(e) preempts states from adopting emissions standards for both 
new and non-new nonroad vehicles.213 Therefore, using the short-
hand term “in-use” to describe a regulation of a nonroad source does 
not address any relevant characteristic in the preemption analysis.214 
Regardless of whether a vehicle is new, non-new, or in-use, the rele-
vant question remains whether a state regulation is a “standard or 
other requirement relating to the control of emissions.”215
C. CARB Must Obtain EPA Authorization for the New Regulation 
1. California’s Regulation Is the Type Which Requires EPA 
Authorization 
 California must obtain EPA authorization to enforce its new regu-
lation, because it is a “standard relating to the control of emis-
sions.”216 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) maintains that 
EPA authorization is not required because the new rule is an in-use 
regulation, but this does not address the proper question of whether 
the regulation is a “standard” as deªned by the Supreme Court in 
South Coast Air Quality.217
 The ªrst question is whether California’s new regulation—which 
prohibits Category 3 engines from emitting levels of PM, NOx, or SOx 
higher than the rates achievable by use of certain fuels—imposes 
“standards . . . relating to the control of emissions from [nonroad] 
vehicles or engines.”218 If this question is answered in the afªrmative, 
then California must obtain EPA authorization for the regulations.219
 The regulation is a standard if it sets “criteria . . . relat[ing] to the 
emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine . . . [such as a require-
ment that] a vehicle must not emit more than a certain amount of a 
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given pollutant.”220 California’s regulation is clearly covered by this 
ªrst category of regulations that the Supreme Court identiªed as fal-
ling within the standards expressly preempted by section 209.221
 California’s regulation requires that vessels limit their emissions 
of PM, NOx, and SOx to the levels that would result from the use of 
marine gas oil or marine diesel oil with 0.5% sulfur content or less.222 
In order to comply with the regulation, vessels “must not emit more 
than a certain amount of a given pollutant” and therefore the regula-
tion falls within one of the speciªc categories listed by the Supreme 
Court as a standard relating to the control of emissions under section 
209.223 The “certain amount” is the amount that would be emitted by 
the use of the speciªed low-sulfur fuels.224 The “given pollutants” are 
PM, NOx, and SOx.225 Thus, because it is a standard, section 209(e) 
requires California to obtain EPA authorization before enforcing the 
regulation.226
 It is crucial that California sets emission levels based on certain 
fuels rather than simply requiring certain fuels.227 Although the regu-
lation itself does not explicitly set a speciªc number limit on the level 
of emissions from ships, it does set a speciªc level that is calculable for 
each individual ship, thereby setting a “certain amount” over which 
each ship is not permitted to emit.228 Under the rule, each ship owner 
or operator can determine its allowable “certain amount” by calculat-
ing what quantity of the pollutants the ship would emit if 0.5% sulfur 
fuel were used.229 The ship owner or operator can then decide either 
to use the speciªed fuel or to use a different technique to insure that 
the calculated “certain amount” of allowable pollutants is not ex-
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ceeded.230 Thus, California does not evade qualiªcation of the regula-
tion as a “standard” simply by not providing actual numbers in its 
regulation, because the regulation still sets a knowable “certain 
amount” of emissions that ships may not exceed.231
2. Regulations Applied to Ocean-Going Vessels Are Not Expressly 
Preempted by the CAA 
 California’s new regulation is not expressly preempted by section 
209(e)(1), because the vessels it regulates are not farm or construc-
tion engines or equipment of less than 175 horsepower, or locomo-
tives.232 Therefore, because the CAA authorizes California to regulate 
both new and non-new sources other than those covered by section 
209(e)(1), California is not preempted by the CAA from regulating 
the ocean-going vessels which are the subject of the new regulation.233
3. California Fulªlls the Section 209(e) Requirements to Obtain EPA 
Authorization 
 California’s regulation fulªlls the requirements for obtaining 
EPA authorization under section 209(e).234 First, California’s regula-
tion will be “at least as protective of the public health and welfare as 
the applicable Federal standards.”235 While EPA has not set any simi-
lar standards because it can not regulate non-new vessels, the United 
States has recognized Annex VI as customary international law.236 
Annex VI sets a worldwide cap on sulfur content in fuel at 4.5%, with 
designated areas requiring no more than 1.5% sulfur fuel.237 By bas-
ing emissions limits on 0.5% sulfur fuel, California’s regulation will be 
more protective than the international rule.238
 The second requirement for obtaining EPA authorization is that 
California needs standards that are different from the federal man-
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date.239 The severity of California’s air pollution sufªciently demon-
strates that the state needs stricter restrictions on diesel emissions.240 
As discussed previously, California’s air pollution is the most severe in 
the country, and is responsible for numerous adverse health effects, 
including asthma and cancer.241 Furthermore, the new regulation is 
applied to large ocean vessels, which are the source of signiªcant 
quantities of pollutants and are expected to emit increasingly greater 
amounts in the near future.242 Thus, California’s uniquely serious air 
pollution problem, and the contribution of ocean vessels to that prob-
lem, clearly illustrate California’s need for further controls such as the 
new regulation.243
D. Possibilities for California to Regulate Without EPA Authorization 
 In South Coast Air Quality, the Supreme Court enumerated the “cri-
teria” that qualiªes as a standard under section 209: “To meet them the 
vehicle must not emit more than a certain amount of a given pollutant, 
must be equipped with a certain type of pollution-control device, or 
must have some other design feature related to the control of emis-
sions.”244 California is likely not preempted by section 209(e) from 
adopting regulations which do not fall within one of the three enumer-
ated categories without EPA authorization.245
 Accordingly, if California instead adopted a fuel-type regulation 
which required the use of a speciªc fuel—as EPA has decided is allow-
able246—EPA authorization would not be required to avoid preemp-
tion under section 209(e), because a fuel-type requirement does not 
fall into any of the categories listed by the Supreme Court in South 
Coast Air Quality.247 Unlike the newly adopted regulation, a regulation 
which requires the use of a certain fuel by nonroad engines would not 
fall into the category of “standards” which prohibit emissions over a 
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“certain amount of a given pollutant.”248 A simple fuel-type require-
ment is not equivalent to one which prohibits the engine or vehicle 
from emitting more than a certain amount of a pollutant, because a 
vehicle that achieves the same numerical emission rate by alternative 
means would still violate the fuel-type requirement.249
 For example, suppose the California regulation simply required 
ships to use fuel with a maximum of 0.5% sulfur content.250 A ship 
that did not use the fuel, but instead used a device, such as a ªlter, to 
limit its emissions to a level lower than the rates achieved by using the 
prescribed fuel would still violate the regulation.251 Thus, this hypo-
thetical regulation does not prohibit a vehicle from emitting more 
than a certain amount of pollutants, because compliance with the 
regulation would not be determined by a quantitative measure of the 
vehicle’s emissions, unlike California’s new regulation.252 In effect, 
this hypothetical—and narrower—regulation would achieve the same 
result as California’s actual regulation, which allows alternative means 
of compliance.253 However, by providing fewer options for compliance 
than the regulation California has actually adopted, California may 
avoid classiªcation as a “standard,” and thereby avoid the EPA au-
thorization process.254
 Additionally, a fuel-type requirement does not fall within any of 
the other categories of “standards” listed by the Supreme Court, and 
therefore would not be preempted by section 209(e).255 A fuel-type 
requirement does not require engines or vehicles to “be equipped 
with a certain type of pollution-control device,” nor does it require 
“some other design feature related to the control of emissions.”256
 The practical difference between the new California regulation 
and the one suggested without EPA authorization is minimal, but the 
difference is decisive in determining the preemptive effect of the 
complicated and seemingly odd structure of section 209.257 The slight 
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difference between emissions limits based on the use of a certain fuel 
and requirements for use of that same fuel is enough to make the 
former fall within the deªnition of “standards relating to the control 
of emissions,” while the latter avoids such a classiªcation.258 As a re-
sult, section 209(e) preempts California from adopting and enforcing 
the emission limit based on a fuel type unless it obtains EPA authori-
zation, although California is most likely not preempted by section 
209(e) from adopting a fuel-type requirement that achieves virtually 
the same result.259
Conclusion 
 Section 209(e) of the CAA establishes federal preemption of state 
regulation of emissions from nonroad vehicles and engines that is 
much broader in scope than the preemption covering motor vehicles. 
Speciªcally, states are preempted from adopting “standards or other 
requirements relating to the control of emissions” from both new and 
non-new nonroad vehicles, whereas for motor vehicles, states are only 
preempted from regulating new engines and vehicles. California is 
provided an exception, and may avoid preemption if it obtains EPA 
authorization for its regulations that fall under the deªnition of 
“standards or other requirements relating to the control of emis-
sions.” Consequently, the threshold question in a preemption analysis 
under section 209(e) is whether the state regulation is a “standard or 
other requirement relating to the control of emissions,” according to 
the deªnition adopted by the Supreme Court. 
 Section 209(e) preempts California’s new regulation unless Cali-
fornia obtains EPA authorization, because it establishes a “standard 
relating to the control of emissions from nonroad vehicles.” Califor-
nia’s regulation qualiªes as one of the types of regulations falling 
within the Supreme Court’s deªnition of “standard” under section 
209 because it requires that the ocean vessels do “not emit more than 
a certain amount” of pollutants. Therefore, California must obtain 
EPA authorization in order to avoid preemption. However, California 
may be able to sidestep the EPA authorization requirement by adopt-
ing a slightly altered regulation. A California regulation requiring 
ships to use a speciªc low-sulfur fuel may not require EPA authoriza-
tion because it does not fall within the deªned categories of standards 
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under section 209. By adopting a regulation with this subtle differ-
ence, California may be able to avoid both preemption and the EPA 
authorization process, while taking sorely needed steps to reduce the 
state’s air pollution. 
